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Injury trends and mortality in adult patients with major trauma in New South Wales

In reply: In our study,1 we allocated the numbers and type of trauma centres according to New South Wales Department of Health terminology and the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons Trauma Verification Committee model resource criteria. The latter reflected the resource availability of 24-hour,
7-day per week specialty services such as plastic surgery, cardiothoracic surgery and neurosurgery at those centres during the study period,2,3 as outlined in Box 1 of the original manuscript. Since publication of the article, we have found further NSW Health documentation that designates Nepean, Gosford and Wollongong Hospitals as regional trauma centres.4

Our results showed that trauma mortality decreased from 15% in 2003 to 12.9% in 2007. The adjusted relative odds of mortality decreased significantly from 2003 to 2007, except in 2005.1

We agree with Stapleton and colleagues that prehospital triage tools for major trauma are imperfect and are universally acknowledged to have varying undertriage and overtriage rates.5 However, we would argue that conclusions from recent single-centre Australian studies are limited by inadequate data.6 The T1 protocol was not considered as a confounder or used as an outcome measure in our study.

With regard to neurotrauma, injury to specific body regions including the head or neck was controlled for in our analysis. We acknowledged that the Trauma Registry data were limited to patients with an injury severity score > 15, and agree that examination of treatment and outcomes for all trauma patients is needed.

The need for quality and quantity in emergency medical care rotations for interns

To the Editor: A national registration standard for internship
will apply from 2014.1 In addition to
10-week rotations in medicine and surgery, interns will need to obtain
8 weeks’ experience in emergency medical care. A national framework
for the accreditation of intern training programs is also being developed.2

The new standard allows emergency medical care rotations outside of emergency departments (EDs), including selected general practices. Although primary care settings can facilitate valuable training, there is limited evidence that a community placement can effectively substitute
for an emergency medicine term.

Emergency medicine terms expose interns to a broad range of acute undifferentiated illness not often encountered in other rotations.3 These terms also facilitate acquisition of key skills and knowledge, including the ability to prioritise under time pressure, recognise “sick” and “well” patients, perform common procedures and interact with other health care team members.3,4 EDs are the most appropriate setting for this generalist medical experience.

Rigorous assessment of interns is an important but under-recognised capability of the emergency medicine experience. A recent study showed that ED-based terms are crucial in detecting underperformance,5 which probably relates to the proximity of supervision, the requirement for interns to act as primary treating clinician and the necessity for decision making. EDs may be the only setting where interns’ clinical skills are directly observed.

Supervisory capacity may limit provision of ED-based experiences4 and, with expanding graduate numbers,6 demand will increase further. Although emergency medicine terms in alternative settings may improve access to placements, the accreditation framework2 must protect against
any dilution of clinical experience. Guidelines must define minimum standards for training opportunities, supervision and assessment, not just casemix.

Solutions that sustainably increase ED training capacity should be supported, including innovative models of supervision. Structured teaching and simulation also have roles.4 The More Learning for Interns in Emergency (MoLIE) program, for example, increases training capacity and simultaneously enhances the educational experience.7

Australia must continue to support learning in emergency medicine by sufficiently resourcing EDs to deliver high-quality teaching and training to interns, and the unique elements of emergency medicine rotations must be protected by robust accreditation standards.

Effect of an electronic medical record information system on emergency department performance

Electronic medical record (EMR) systems have the potential to improve quality of health care, streamline workflow and increase efficiency in the health care system.1,2 However, potential problems have also been identified, such as the cost of implementing and maintaining EMR systems, and the skills and training needed for using them.1,2

Despite the proposed benefits and pitfalls of EMR systems, there is limited research on their effectiveness.24 Specifically, there is a lack of data regarding their effect on definable clinical end points, such as patient mortality.5 Locally developed systems, designed around local procedures and conditions and implemented from the ground up, have shown benefit.68 Specific computer-assisted decision support has also been shown to be of benefit.79 A clinical information system must be fit for purpose for any gain to be made.10

FirstNet (Cerner), an EMR system, has been introduced in emergency departments (EDs) around New South Wales since 2007. This system replaced the Emergency Department Information System (EDIS; Healthcare Group, CSC), which was previously used in most NSW EDs and is still in use in some. Despite limited literature indicating that FirstNet has decreased performance in EDs in Australia,10,11 and reports of problems with Cerner programs overseas,1215 there were no objective quantitative data to substantiate these concerns.

FirstNet was introduced to the Nepean Hospital ED in March 2009. All medical documentation became electronic, including doctors’ examination notes, nursing progress notes, patient observations, and electronic ordering of pathology and radiology investigations. Our study’s aim was to determine whether the implementation of FirstNet was associated with an improvement or decline in key performance indicators (KPIs) of patient flow in the Nepean Hospital ED.

Methods

We conducted a retrospective observational study comparing ED performance before and after FirstNet was introduced on 24 March 2009. Nepean Hospital is a 453-bed tertiary referral and teaching hospital serving the western suburbs of Sydney, NSW. The ED sees about 54 000 patients each year, with a 20% paediatric caseload and a 36% admission rate.

The control group consisted of patients presenting during the 6-month period from July to December 2008, when EDIS (version 9) was in use. During this period, only patient triage and tracking was electronic, with all other ED functions relying on paper documentation. The study group consisted of patients presenting during the 6-month period from July to December 2009. This period was considered appropriate because the new FirstNet EMR system had then been operational for more than 3 months. The version of FirstNet in use at Nepean Hospital was the standardised state-based build slated to be introduced across all hospitals in NSW.

Outcome measures were: waiting time for all patients; waiting time, treatment time and total time for discharged patients (see definitions in Box 1); proportion of patients who did not wait to be seen by a doctor (DNW rate); proportion of ambulances with offload waiting times longer than 30 minutes; and mean number of patients seen per non-specialist doctor per shift.

We also collected data on potential confounding variables: number of presentations to the ED; number of presentations by Australasian Triage Scale category; mean daily ED occupancy; and number of shifts worked per week by ED specialists and non-specialists. For this analysis, mean daily ED occupancy (Box 1) was used as a measure of overcrowding. Data relating to access block were not collected.

The numbers of shifts worked by medical staff were retrieved from ED rosters. The number of patients seen by each doctor per shift was extracted from EDIS but could not be extracted from FirstNet. Therefore, a mean number of patients seen per doctor per shift was calculated using the FirstNet data on presentations and staffing levels.

The data were imported into SPSS version 19 (IBM). The distribution of waiting time, treatment time and total time was non-normal, and these results are reported as medians with interquartile ranges and compared using the Mann–Whitney U test. All proportional data were compared using the Pearson χ2 test. The mean number of patients seen per non-specialist doctor per shift and ED occupancy were compared using the independent t test. We used statistical modelling to attempt to control for the effect of potential confounding variables (see Appendix).

Ethics approval for the study was granted by the Sydney West Area Health Service Human Research Ethics Committee, Nepean Campus.

Results

There were 25 620 presentations in the 2008 control period and 26 128 in the 2009 study period. Triage category distribution was similar in each period (Box 2).

There were too few patients in triage category 1 for meaningful analysis of this subgroup. We also found that data on disposition status (did not wait v discharged v admitted) for most patients presenting in July and August 2009 were missing in FirstNet. Therefore, only ambulance offload data could be analysed for the full 6 months. All other comparative measures used data from September to December only of the control and study periods (16 976 and 17 281 presentations, respectively).

There was a statistically significant increase in waiting time for all patients (Box 3) and in waiting time, treatment time and total time for discharged patients (Box 4), both overall and for most triage categories. The waiting time for triage category 2, for all patients and discharged patients, was shorter after the introduction of FirstNet, but treatment time and total time increased for discharged patients in this category. Treatment time for triage category 4 patients discharged from the ED was also shorter after the introduction of FirstNet, but there was no improvement in waiting time or total time for these patients. There was also a reduction in treatment time and total time for category 5 patients discharged from the ED.

After the introduction of FirstNet, there was a statistically significant increase in the DNW rate and the proportion of ambulances with offload waiting times longer than 30 minutes, and a decrease in the mean number of patients seen per non-specialist doctor per shift (Box 5). The daily medical officer roster was unchanged between the control and study periods. However, there was a significant decrease in the mean number of shifts actually worked by both specialists and non-specialists, due to staff vacancies and sick leave. Mean ED occupancy was similar in the two study periods.

After adjusting for the effect of total presentations, specialist and non-specialist staffing, and ED occupancy, the mean total time for discharged patients was 41 minutes longer (95% CI, 29–53; P < 0.001) in 2009 than 2008. Similarly, the DNW rate remained 6.0 percentage points higher (95% CI, 4.8–7.0; P < 0.001) in 2009 than 2008.

Discussion

Overall, there was a significant increase in the waiting time for all patients, and the waiting time, treatment time and total time for discharged patients after the introduction of Cerner FirstNet in the Nepean Hospital ED compared with the control period.

ED efficiency is affected by many factors both within and outside the ED, including the time taken for inpatient team reviews and “acceptance” of an admission, waiting for a bed on the ward, and completion of clerical and clinical documentation. In a retrospective observational study, it is not possible to directly control for these confounding variables. However, as discharged patients are the group whose care is least affected by these confounding factors, studying this group attempts to isolate actual changes in ED efficiency from the effects of these factors.

For all patients as well as discharged patients, we found that waiting time for those in triage category 2 was significantly shorter in the study period than the control period. Changes to ED workflow in response to poor performance in standard KPIs is a continuous process, and it may be that there was some change in work practice to try to improve the category 2 performance. However, the treatment time and total time for discharged category 2 patients were still significantly longer in the study group. Thus, any benefit from the decreased waiting time in this category was not sustained through to total time in the ED. For triage category 4 patients, treatment time was reduced in the study period, but again this was not borne out in a reduction in total time for these patients.

In contrast, waiting time for all patients in triage category 5 was increased in the study period. However, treatment time and total time for discharged patients in this group were shorter with FirstNet. Category 5 patients are largely seen in the fast-track area of the ED. They do not occupy a bed for the period of their assessment and treatment and thus are generally not affected by ED overcrowding or access block for ward admissions. It could be that there is some benefit from FirstNet for these patients.

The increases in the DNW rate and the proportion of ambulances waiting more than 30 minutes to offload, and the decrease in the mean number of patients seen per non-specialist doctor per shift indicate overall deterioration in the performance of the ED after implementation of FirstNet.17,18 This could potentially increase ED overcrowding because even a small decrease in treatment rate is cumulative, as it causes further increases in the number of patients waiting ahead of new arrivals.17 Worldwide, studies in different centres have found an association between overcrowding and reduced access to care, decreased quality measures and poor outcomes,17 including increasing mortality as overcrowding in EDs increases.1921

We used ED occupancy as a marker of ED overcrowding, to assess any confounding effect it may have on the efficiency of care for discharged patients. There was no significant difference in ED occupancy in the two study periods, despite the significant change in ED performance. This is likely due to the large increase in total time for discharged patients being offset by the large increase in the proportion of patients who did not wait.

We chose to sample 6 months of presentations to limit the effect of potential confounding variables such as seasonal variations, staffing changes and chance variability in caseload and casemix between the two periods, and we matched the periods of the year for which we collected data. Junior medical officers change terms every 10 weeks to 3 months, and it is possible that staff relatively new to the ED with little experience in using FirstNet could have affected the results. However, the term changes are similar from year to year, and we would expect the findings to have been controlled by examining the same 6-month period of each year. As patient presentations per triage category were similar in the control and study periods, it is unlikely that differences in patient distribution across categories were responsible for any of the findings of this study.

Staffing levels were lower in the study period than the control period and this could have affected ED performance, as fewer doctors may lead to longer waiting times.22 However, the deterioration in total time performance and DNW rate remained after adjusting for the measured confounders. Specialists in our ED do not have a distinct patient load; they have a supervisory role to ensure quality of care and patient flow. For this reason, we only measured the mean number of patients seen per non-specialist doctor per shift.

Another possible confounder is a learning effect of the new EMR system. FirstNet was operational for more than 3 months before the study period, and all medical staff had undergone the prescribed training before its introduction. As medical and nursing staff may rotate through the ED for variable periods of as little as 10 weeks, if the learning effect is greater than 3 months, then they will have spent a large part of their time in the ED learning the system without ever becoming adept at using it.

Although we performed statistical modelling to attempt to control for the effect of the measured confounding variables, this process is limited, as the functional relationships assumed by our modelling may not match the non-linear nature of the data. Also, it is acknowledged that statistically adjusting for confounders has its own limitations and cannot account for unknown and unmeasured factors.

An important post-hoc finding was the poor quality of data for the first 2 months of the study period, especially with respect to patient disposition. For this reason, we could only use 4 months of data from the control and study periods. In addition, there were missing data points for some time measurements.

Since the second half of 2009, when the study data were collected from FirstNet, there have been upgrades to the software. However, these have been largely cosmetic, such as the design of the discharge summary and the appearance of the tracking screen, or addressing issues of patient safety, such as introducing standard checks when ordering radiology investigations and highlighting the patient row when accessing a patient’s record. It is not clear whether these changes would lead to significant improvements in ED performance.

Overall, we found that implementation of Cerner FirstNet was associated with deterioration of the performance of the Nepean Hospital ED with respect to the measured outcomes.

1 Definitions

Discharged patients: patients who were assessed by an emergency department (ED) medical officer, including receiving any investigations and treatment, and discharged home from the ED. Excludes patients who did not wait for medical review.

Waiting time: time from arrival to when first seen by a medical officer.

Treatment time: time from when first seen by a medical officer to discharge from the ED.

Total time: time from arrival to discharge from the ED.

ED occupancy: number of patients in the ED, including patients yet to be seen by a doctor, patients undergoing assessment and treatment in the ED, and admitted patients boarded in the ED.16 Mean daily ED occupancy was calculated based on hourly census calculations (number of patients present in the ED plus number of presentations to the ED minus number departing the ED each hour) averaged over the 24-hour period.

2 Emergency department presentations per triage category, July – December, 2008 and 2009

Triage category

2008*

2009


1

210 (0.8%)

196 (0.8%)

2

4292 (16.8%)

4239 (16.2%)

3

9171 (35.8%)

9391 (35.9%)

4

9122 (35.6%)

9850 (37.7%)

5

2825 (11.0%)

2452 (9.4%)

Total

25 620 (100%)

26 128 (100%)


* Control period (Emergency Department Information System). Study period (Cerner FirstNet).

3 Comparison of waiting time for all patients, September – December, 2008 and 2009

No. of patients*


Waiting time (min), median (IQR)


Triage category

2008

2009

2008

2009

P§


2

2484

2809

40 (9–110)

15 (7–34)

< 0.001

3

5212

5285

42 (10–118)

129 (54–244)

< 0.001

4

5618

5124

38 (9–110)

101 (43–211)

< 0.001

5

1851

1243

39 (10–103)

55 (24–114)

< 0.001

Overall

15 298

14 581

40 (10–111)

78 (25–184)

< 0.001


IQR = interquartile range. * Excludes patients who did not wait for medical review. There were too few patients in triage category 1 for meaningful analysis of this subgroup. Overall figures include all triage category 1 patients for whom data were available. Control period (Emergency Department Information System). Study period (Cerner FirstNet). § Mann–Whitney U test.

4 Comparison of waiting time, treatment time and total time for discharged patients,* September – December, 2008 and 2009

No. of patients


Waiting time (min), median (IQR)


Treatment time (min), median (IQR)


Total time (min), median (IQR)


Triage
category

2008

2009§

2008

2009§

P

2008

2009§

P

2008

2009§

P


2

1434

962

49 (12–116)

16 (8–37)

< 0.001

127 (53–238)

282 (177–437)

< 0.001

208 (119–343)

308 (209–468)

< 0.001

3

2987

2716

51 (15–125)

139 (59–258)

< 0.001

127 (54–240)

198 (108–324)

< 0.001

217 (121–352)

375 (238–543)

< 0.001

4

3377

3548

46 (13–118)

95 (41–202)

< 0.001

129 (55–236)

103 (49–208)

< 0.001

214 (116–348)

236 (138–395)

< 0.001

5

1066

985

50 (15–113)

57 (25–117)

0.14

122 (56–241)

70 (33–146)

< 0.001

209 (120–330)

157 (90–270)

< 0.001

Overall

8941

8237

49 (14–119)

87 (32–195)

< 0.001

128 (55–238)

147 (64–276)

< 0.001

214 (119–348)

280 (158–447)

< 0.001


IQR = interquartile range. * Some patients were missing time variable data in FirstNet and were excluded from analysis for that time variable but could be included for analysis of other time variables if data were present. Excludes patients who did not wait for medical review. There were too few patients in triage category 1 for meaningful analysis of this subgroup. Overall figures include all triage category 1 patients for whom data were available. Control period (Emergency Department Information System). § Study period (Cerner FirstNet). Mann–Whitney U test.

5 Comparison of did not wait rate, ambulance offload > 30 min, number of patients seen per non-specialist per shift, staffing levels and emergency department (ED) occupancy, 2008 and 2009*

2008

2009

Difference (95% CI)

P


Did not wait rate

8.3% (1406/16 976)

15.6% (2691/17 281)

7.3% (6.7% to 8.1%)

< 0.001

Ambulance offload waiting time > 30 min

10.5% (814/7726)

13.3% (1064/7981)

2.8% (1.8% to 3.8%)

< 0.001

Mean number of patients seen per non-specialist per shift

7.34

7.05

0.29 (0.22 to 0.57)

0.04

Mean number of non-specialist shifts worked per week

121.8

118.6

3.2 (0.6 to 5.9)

0.02

Mean number of specialist shifts worked per week

19.9

16.4

3.5 (2.2 to 4.7)

< 0.001

Mean daily ED occupancy (number of patients)

35.6

37.2

1.6 (1.4 to 4.6)

0.27


* For both years, ambulance offload data are for the 6-month period from July to December. All other data are for September to December only.

Control period (Emergency Department Information System). Study period (Cerner FirstNet).

Good HIT and bad HIT

First and foremost, do no harm. Second, do some good

One of the key issues for high-volume, high-risk workplaces like hospital emergency departments (EDs) is the struggle of conflicting aims. While hospital managers need information systems for data collection and storage, clinicians need efficient clinical documentation, data retrieval and order-entry systems that save time rather than steal it from the patient. The work of clinicians is aided by reliable data but impaired by the delays of real-time input, difficult system navigation, suboptimal presentation of information, and other problems in the user experience of health information technology (HIT).1

Mohan and colleagues’ study of the impact of an electronic medical record information system on ED performance had some limitations.2 It was retrospective and unable to control for all confounders, and therefore could only show a correlation with ED delays, not causation. However, the premise for the study delivers an important message — the work required to use the information system was perceived by the ED staff to directly conflict with time spent with patients.

Another study has shown that the same electronic medical record information system is perceived to have had a negative impact on the care of patients, as well as the productivity and morale of staff, in six EDs in New South Wales.3 The need to be hypervigilant about the accuracy of the information supplied by the electronic health record compounds an already stressful clinical environment, which in turn leads to resentment towards the technology and the people who have imposed it. This makes it “bad” HIT. Unless this is corrected, HIT efforts will overuse precious health care resources, will be unlikely to achieve claimed benefits for many years to come, and may actually cause harm.4,5

The large HIT corporations produce a type of technology that is best categorised as enterprise resource planning (ERP), which has its roots in the manufacturing industry. It is based on the idea that all processes within an organisation can be standardised, and that all processes of the same type should have their information modelled and processed in the same manner. If this high degree of standardisation were considered the best way to process and model information derived from clinical activity, then ERP would be a favoured technology to adopt, as has happened in many places.

However, there is an alternative, almost contradictory, perspective on the nature of clinical work: that it is non-deterministic and performed by a group of diverse staff working in an ecologically stable network of people that has to respond to diverse medical needs and diseases. The ecology model accommodates staff joining and leaving the process, with differing needs emerging at different times, so that the other individuals in the network have to adapt and modify their behaviour and improvise in an unpredictable manner. Amid all this variability is the ever-demanding imperative to improve the processes of care and attention to the patient, while also increasing staff productivity.6

Where the ERP model has been imposed in the clinical setting, staff may be coerced into an approach to their work that is at odds with established best practices. This could only be considered “good” HIT if it brought greater staff productivity with at least no loss (and, preferably, improvement) of patient safety and services and staff morale.

It is not enough just to identify problems: effort must be invested in transforming bad HIT into good HIT. This process must identify and optimise all the operative factors: human behaviour, system design, equipment performance, skills of the IT participants, and the operational policy framework.7 Good HIT should include clinician control of the interface design for content, dataflow and workflow. It includes the ability to change the system in real time, and it incorporates inbuilt data analytical capability, natural language processing, and native interoperability and clinical coding.8 Finally, there must be an appropriate opportunity to test systems for useability, effectiveness and suitability before their release.

There must be a move away from standardised processing models and towards improving the user experience in the clinical setting. Clinicians should not have to shoehorn their activity into predefined, externally imposed work processes that do not reflect actual activity and will not improve efficiency. A true patient-focused system aligns all its components towards the same aim. Like a good clinician, good HIT does no harm — to patients or staff.

The National Emergency Access Target (NEAT): can quality go with timeliness?

Increasing demand on health services during times of austerity has necessitated examination of the way we deliver health care.1,2 In 2008, Western Australian tertiary hospital emergency departments (EDs) were experiencing the highest rates of access block (the percentage of patients who wait longer than 8 hours for an inpatient bed) in the country.3,4 The well documented relationship between access block and poor health outcomes for patients,59 coupled with adverse media and public opinion about Western Australia’s public hospitals, demanded a significant response. A Minister for Health delegation travelled to the United Kingdom to examine National Health Service (NHS) reforms,10,11 to learn from their successes to improve health care delivery in WA. Subsequently, in April 2009, the Four Hour Rule (FHR) Program was launched in WA.12 Stage 1 of the program involved the state’s four tertiary public hospitals: Princess Margaret Hospital for Children, Royal Perth Hospital, Sir Charles Gairdner Hospital and Fremantle Hospital.

WA hospitals were initially set the same final FHR target as hospitals in the UK, which was that 98% of all patients presenting to their ED should be admitted, discharged or transferred within 4 hours of arrival. However, key differences between the two programs were that the WA FHR program had a clear and defined focus on monitoring patient safety and quality outcomes, that there were no financial incentives or sanctions for hospitals that achieved or failed to achieve the set targets, and the launch coincided with a challenging time in global finances. This presented a compelling need to examine systems and processes, so, while limited funding was made available to support change initiatives, it was agreed there would be no allocation of recurrent funding, meaning no additional beds or staff. In June 2010, the UK government introduced a suite of new clinical quality indicators and reduced their FHR target to 95%.13 The purpose of these new indicators, which were very similar to those already being monitored in WA’s FHR program, was to broaden the measurement of quality to cover effectiveness of treatment and patient satisfaction.

The aim of WA’s FHR program was to improve patients’ experience and quality of care by reducing delays in the ED and streamlining processes throughout the hospital. With the recent introduction of the National Emergency Access Target (NEAT),14 we report our experience of establishing a successful FHR program.

Methods

Princess Margaret Hospital for Children (PMH) in Perth, WA, is a 220-bed tertiary paediatric hospital, that has more than 65 000 presentations to the ED annually. The FHR program used a clinical services redesign model, based on principles from Six Sigma and “lean thinking”. Clinical services redesign is a proven, rigorous international model used in large complex organisations.1517 The model is data-driven and consumer- (ie, patient-) focused. Six Sigma is a disciplined, data-driven approach for eliminating defects in processes.18 The Six Sigma improvement model consists of five phases: Define, Measure, Analyse, Improve and Control (DMAIC). Lean is a collection of tools and principles that aim to improve health services by eliminating waste, adding value to processes and allowing continuous improvement.19

The FHR program commenced in April 2009 with a strictly time-limited 6-month diagnostic phase, followed by the implementation of solutions over 18 months. While the FHR program office led the DMAIC process, each step, including all solutions, were determined, developed and implemented by hospital staff. The program targets were for 85% of patients attending the ED to be admitted, discharged or transferred within 4 hours of arrival by April 2010, 95% by October 2010 and 98% by April 2011.

DMAIC methods

Define phase (5 weeks): The “patient journey” was critically examined and mapped from arrival at triage to discharge from hospital. Open forums were attended by more than 300 hospital staff; their purpose was to map current processes and identify key issues (the “voice of the organisation”). We also collected information from children, adolescents and families about their experiences (the “voice of the patient”).

Measure phase (6 weeks): After the collection of baseline data, we developed a data measurement plan, including key high-level and low-level measures relating to the patient journey.

Analyse phase (6 weeks): We determined root causes of all major issues, generated, and then tested hypotheses using data and statistical analyses, to validate or refute each root cause.

Improve phase (7 weeks): Hospital staff determined solutions to the root cause of each issue. Implementation plans and business cases were developed, presented to the hospital Executive and submitted to the Department of Health (DoH) to be considered for funding.

Control phase (18 months): Solutions were implemented, with an eventual shift in focus from change management to expected performance, and integration of solutions into normal hospital business.

Personnel

An FHR program office was established, employing one full-time equivalent (FTE) Program Lead (senior registered nurse), a 0.2 FTE Clinical Lead (paediatrician), and one FTE Project Officer. A data analyst and program adviser were seconded from the DoH during the first 6 months of the program. Members of the program office and key senior staff received training in clinical services redesign methods. Clinical staff from areas of the hospital that would be making changes were identified and invited to join solution groups. Each solution group appointed a chairperson, who was responsible for leading the change and was assigned a member of the hospital Executive, who was accountable for implementing the change.

Governance

Strong governance was required to provide clarity and direction around roles, responsibilities and the authority to implement solutions. The FHR program governance structure considered and clearly articulated how the FHR program aligned with PMH’s current and future organisational structure, as well as with the structure of WA Health.

Outcome measures and data analysis

Key outcome measures included the overall FHR percentage (ie, percentage of all patients presenting to the ED whose management complied with the FHR), and the percentages of patients admitted, discharged or transferred from the ED for whom this happened within 4 hours of arrival at triage, and the percentage of patients discharged from inpatient wards before 10 am and 12 pm. Critical countermeasures (Box 1) were also reported to ensure that any potential adverse effects of the program were apparent immediately. The Princess Margaret Hospital Ethics Committee approved the reporting of this study (ethics number, 3637).

Results

The overall FHR performance at PMH increased steadily over the first 3 years of the program, averaging 87% in 2009 and 95% in 2011 (Box 2). The increase in overall performance resulted from improvements in both the percentage of patients being admitted to hospital within 4 hours (62% in 2009; 74% in 2010; and 80% in 2011), and those being discharged home from the ED within 4 hours (94% in 2009; 96% in 2010; and 98% in 2011).

The Define phase of DMAIC identified more than 400 issues, with common themes including duplication of processes, lack of resources, mismatch between demand and availability of key services, poor communication and inadequate discharge planning. After grouping, 30 major issues remained. These were measured to determine their size and impact, followed by root-cause analysis and generation of solutions (Box 3).

ED attendances increased by 12.3% from 2009 to 2011 (Box 1). During this period, the admission rate from the ED fell, but with the increase in ED attendances, the total number of patients admitted increased marginally. There was no significant change in the percentage of unplanned reattendances to the ED within 48 hours of discharge, the percentage of patient complaints or inhospital mortality. In addition, the number of elective surgeries performed at PMH increased by 9% from 2009 to 2011.

The mean time from patients arriving at triage to being seen by an ED doctor did not change (44 minutes in 2009; 47 minutes in 2010; and 46 minutes in 2011). There was a reduction in the time from being seen by a doctor to the decision to admit being made (96 minutes in 2009; 84 minutes in 2010; and 79 minutes in 2011) and in the time from the decision to admit to the patient departing the ED (109 minutes in 2009; 66 minutes in 2010; and 46 minutes in 2011).

In response to UK studies suggesting that some patients were being “pushed” out of EDs just before the 4-hour target, with a spike in ED departures between 3.5 hours and 4 hours,2022 we used a critical countermeasure, with a weekly figure showing the total time each patient spent in the ED (Box 4, A). In 2011, the median length of stay for all patients attending the ED was less than 2 hours, with only a small spike in activity before the 4-hour mark. For patients being admitted to hospital in 2011, 30% departed the ED within 2 hours, 60% within 3 hours and 80% within 4 hours of arrival. Access block fell from 2.4% in 2009 to 0.6% in 2011.

The key factor contributing to the improvement in patients being admitted from the ED within 4 hours was the increase in the percentage of patients being discharged home from an inpatient bed before 10 am. In April 2009, only 18% of all patients discharged home on a particular day were discharged before 10 am, with 50% still occupying their bed at 3 pm. PMH now consistently discharges over 30% of all patients before 10 am and 55% by 12 pm (Box 4, B).

Discussion

The FHR is a powerful change-management tool that has driven the redesign of processes and clinical services throughout PMH, improving the timeliness of care for patients presenting to the ED without any detriment to clinical care.

Critical to the success of the program has been the improvement in timely discharge of patients from inpatient wards. During the Define phase of DMAIC, one parent noted: “it is harder to get discharged from PMH than it is to get admitted”. This was a consistent complaint from families, prompting a major focus on improving discharge processes. There are now a predictable number of discharges before 10 am and 12 pm each day, allowing the Patient Flow Unit to plan more accurately for the predictable admissions from the ED and for elective surgery. Importantly, the improvements in early discharges were achieved without resorting to establishing a discharge lounge (an area where patients who are clinically fit for discharge wait pending arrival of their discharge medications, equipment or transport), as families made it clear that once their child was considered well enough to be discharged, they wanted to go home and not be moved to another part of the hospital.

A UK study comparing performance of hospitals close to the border between England (where waiting time targets existed) and Wales (where such targets did not), showed that patients attending English hospitals faced shorter ED waiting times and had lower mortality rates than those attending Welsh hospitals,23 consistent with the recent finding of reduced mortality rates in WA hospitals after the FHR program was introduced.8 However, there remains much debate about the pros and cons of setting targets in health, with advocates suggesting they have the potential to drive hospital-wide change and sceptics fearing adverse consequences, such as gaming and the neglect of areas not subject to targets.22,24,25 The strong leadership of WA’s FHR program, the emphasis on monitoring performance across all areas of the hospital and the lack of financial incentives for achieving “the target”, have been important factors in reducing the likelihood of adverse outcomes. In addition, while clinical staff were actively involved in the redesign process, helping to determine the direction of change, the hospital Executive made the program part of their core business and were accountable for the implementation of change.26

Good data are critical to any clinical services redesign program. The data collected at PMH was a key and powerful enabler in effecting change. It provided a clear picture of how the hospital was performing at baseline, and allowed many myths to be dispelled by using accurate, specific and clinically meaningful data that were available on a daily basis. A weekly 30-minute clinical and operational meeting has been crucial to the ongoing success of the FHR program. Representatives from all relevant hospital wards and departments attend to review weekly statistics and analyse reasons for breaches of the 4-hour target, allowing continual finetuning of processes.

Our study has some limitations. Our experience and results in a tertiary paediatric hospital may not be reproducible in mixed or adult tertiary hospitals where higher admission rates, patients with multiple comorbid conditions, and dependence on community services to facilitate the discharge of elderly patients, create a greater challenge.12 In addition, the quality measures that we reported were relatively limited and may not have identified all the changes (positive and negative) resulting from the FHR program accurately.

The FHR program provided a unique opportunity to redesign aspects of the patient journey, resulting in significant and sustained benefits for patients and staff. The focus of the redesign program must remain on improving the quality of care for patients, rather than on achieving “the target”. The top 10 lessons we learned are summarised in Box 5.

1 Quality measures for the Four Hour Rule Program at Princess Margaret Hospital, Perth, Western Australia, 2009 to 2011

Measure

2009

2010

2011


Emergency department (ED) attendances

60 060

65 818

67 473

Admissions from ED

11 174

11 372

11 505

Rate of admissions from ED (95% CI)

18.60% (18.29%–18.92%)

17.28% (16.99%–17.57%)

17.05% (16.77%–17.34%)

Unplanned reattendances within 48 hours

352

339

428

Rate of unplanned reattendances (95% CI)

0.59% (0.53%–0.65%)

0.52% (0.46%–0.57%)

0.63% (0.58%–0.70%)

Patient complaints

21

29

30

Rate of patient complaints (95% CI)

0.03% (0.02%–0.05%)

0.04% (0.03%–0.06%)

0.04% (0.03%–0.06%)

Inhospital mortality for admissions from ED

9

16

10

Rate of inhospital mortality for
admissions from ED (95% CI)

0.08% (0.04%–0.15%)

0.14% (0.08%–0.22%)

0.09% (0.04%–0.16%)

2 Overall Four Hour Rule Program performance at Princess Margaret Hospital, Perth, Western Australia, 2009 to 2011

3 Findings from the Six Sigma improvement method, Define, Measure, Analyse, Improve and Control

CNM = clinical nurse manager. ED = emergency department. EDD = estimated date of discharge. HCM = hospital clinical manager. MIT = medical imaging technologist. PCA = personal care assistant.

4 Additional measures of Four Hour Rule Program performance at Princess Margaret Hospital, Perth, Western Australia

5 Top 10 lessons learned in implementing a 4-hour-rule program

  • Ensure the focus for change is hospital-wide and involve as many people from all areas of the hospital as possible.

  • Stay true to the methods and resist all temptation to “jump to solutions”.

  • Ensure accurate data are available in real time, and share it with all hospital staff.

  • Identify and engage local champions for change.

  • Ensure solutions are created and developed by staff working at grassroots level in the areas requiring change.

  • Ensure there is strong governance with clear responsibility and accountability for all solutions.

  • Ensure the hospital executive view the program as a priority.

  • Improving discharge processes is the most effective way to reduce access block in the emergency department.

  • To effect real change, targets must be a challenge to achieve.

  • Ensure there are simple ways for clinical staff to raise issues or concerns in an open and non-confrontational manner.